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ABSTRACT: Recent large-scale land acquisitions for agricultural production (including biofuels), popularly known as 
'land grabbing', have attracted headline attention. Water as both a target and driver of this phenomenon has 
been largely ignored despite the interconnectedness of water and land. This special issue aims to fill this gap and 
to widen and deepen the lens beyond the confines of the literature’s still limited focus on agriculture-driven 
resource grabbing. The articles in this collection demonstrate that the fluid nature of water and its hydrologic 
complexity often obscure how water grabbing takes place and what the associated impacts on the environment 
and diverse social groups are. The fluid properties of water interact with the 'slippery' nature of the grabbing 
processes: unequal power relations; fuzziness between legality and illegality and formal and informal rights; 
unclear administrative boundaries and jurisdictions, and fragmented negotiation processes. All these factors 
combined with the powerful material, discursive and symbolic characteristics of water make 'water grabbing' a 
site for conflict with potential drastic impacts on the current and future uses and benefits of water, rights as well 
as changes in tenure relations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, much media, academic and policy attention has focused on the rapid growth of large-
scale land deals around the world (see GRAIN, 2008; von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009; Cotula et al., 
2009; Borras and Franco, 2010; World Bank, 2010; Zoomers, 2010; Deininger, 2011; De Schutter, 2011; 
Li, 2011; Oxfam, 2011; Cotula, 2012; White et al., 2012). The rush to acquire land as sources of 
alternative energy, crops, and environmental services has led to the phenomenon popularly known as 
'land grabbing' which has made global headlines and contributed to skyrocketing global food prices in 
2008.1 By drawing on notions of 'marginal', 'waste' and 'unproductive' lands, powerful transnational 
and national actors have moved into large-scale agriculture to take advantage of potential windfall 
gains in sub-sectors such as biofuels, 'flex crops' (e.g. sugar cane, palm oil, maize, soya – see Borras et 
                                                          
1
 It is important to note that not all observers see what is happening as 'grabbing', but rather as a business transaction or 
financial investment, involving bona fide negotiations and agreements between private corporate actors and governments 
and/or local communities (or their representatives). Furthermore, it is considered that large-scale investment is often 
desperately needed in rural areas to deliver social and environmental benefits and to help reduce rural poverty (cf. World Bank, 
2010; Deininger, 2011). 
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al., 2012) and other major commodities (e.g. rice, wheat and other cash crops). New demands for land 
have also emerged due to conservation and climate change mitigation measures (hence the notion of 
'green grabbing', cf. Fairhead et al., 2012). 
Despite headline attention to 'land grabbing' the implications for existing water resources (both 
surface water and groundwater) have largely remained ignored. Growing evidence suggests that in 
many cases land grabbing may be motivated by the desire to capture water resources (Smaller and 
Mann, 2009; Woodhouse and Ganho 2011; Skinner and Cotula, 2011). Although water is a potential 
constraint on large-scale agricultural projects, particularly in terms of their scale, many land deal 
contracts do not explicitly mention water requirements (Woodhouse, 2012). Meanwhile, as argued by 
several authors in this collection, the land subjected to new transactions is rarely 'marginal' but either 
already used by small and large scale producers, or of prime quality and associated with irrigation 
facilities, or with the potential for acquiring freshwater from river systems or aquifers (e.g. in arid areas 
land is plentiful and agricultural expansion will not create conflict until water is used). This raises the 
crucial question of whether this water is truly 'available' or whether this assumption will lead to 
unsustainable withdrawals ultimately undermining the quality of the land, or to unequal reallocations 
away from existing users. 
These and many other water aspects have largely been missing dimensions in debates of the global 
rush for land, and articles in this collection thus seek to contribute to filling this crucial gap. However, 
the collection does not stop here. Indeed existing media and policy attention still tends to associate 
land grabbing almost exclusively with large-scale agriculture for food, feed and fuel crops, although 
research and advocacy are beginning to move beyond this important but still rather limited view. 
Shifting from natural resource grabbing to water, among others, also helps to widen the lens to move 
conceptually beyond the tendency to focus exclusively on agriculture-driven resource grabbing. As this 
special issue shows, in addition to large-scale agriculture for food-feed-fuel (and horticulture), today’s 
water grabbing can be seen in relation to a much wider range of activity that spans the food, water, 
energy, climate and mineral domains. The cases presented in the collection demonstrate how in many 
cases water is itself an object of the grabbing, not only for agricultural purposes but also for purposes 
like mining or hydropower development.2 
The articles in this collection also demonstrate that the fluid nature of water and its fluctuating 
variability across time and space, and multiple scales (upstream, downstream, across the watershed or 
basin) have tremendous impacts on water allocation, reallocation, distribution and quality both now 
and in the future. Hydrologic complexity, in particular surface water/groundwater interactions and 
inter-annual variability, often obscures how reallocation takes place and what the associated impacts 
on the environment and diverse social groups are. The fluid properties of water interact with the 
'slippery' nature of the grabbing processes: unequal power relations; fuzziness between legality and 
illegality and formal and informal rights; unclear administrative boundaries and jurisdictions, and 
fraught with negotiation processes. All these factors combined with the powerful material, discursive 
and symbolic characteristics of water make 'water grabbing' a site for conflict with potential drastic 
impacts on the current and future uses and benefits of water as well as changes in tenure relations. 
This collection comprises 14 original articles that provide rich and diverse accounts of the processes, 
experiences and impacts of water grabbing. Most of the articles are located in sub-Saharan Africa but 
we also have accounts from South and South-East Asia, North Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, 
indicating that land and water grabbing are indeed global phenomena. In the rest of this introduction 
we focus on how we understand resource grabbing, in particular water grabbing, the narratives and 
drivers promoting the phenomenon, the mechanisms and processes that facilitate it, its impacts on 
                                                          
2
 Hydropower development is of course not new but there are contemporary twists to hydropower development that can be 
considered water grabbing due to one or more of the following factors: (1) privatisation of rivers; (2) increased involvement of 
private players and the state bowing down to private interests, whether foreign or domestic; (3) the diversion of existing water 
from dams to private interests; and the (4) redefinition of policies and laws to justify river/dam privatisation. 
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local people and ecosystems, and the scope of resistance in reversing some of these trends. We 
conclude with implications for policy and practice. 
GRABBING RESOURCES, CONTROL AND ATTENTION 
The term grabbing raises disturbing memories of past enclosures and dispossessions. This is obviously 
part of the intention in using it – to grab attention and direct it toward a present-day injustice. If not for 
this word, today’s cycle of land grabbing might well have remained largely 'invisible'. Yet surprisingly 
little sustained systematic effort has been given by observers and analysts of the land grabbing trend to 
actually define what they mean by the term. For us, from the outset it is important to have a working 
reference point on the meaning of land/water grabbing. 
Resource grabbing in general broadly refers to appropriation of natural resources, including land and 
water, and the control of their associated uses and benefits, with or without the transfer of ownership, 
usually from poor and marginalised to powerful actors (Fairhead et al., 2012). It is not surprising that 
most critical analysts working on land grabbing today draw on political economy and Marxist traditions, 
in particular David Harvey’s notion of "accumulation by dispossession" (2003).3 Building on this, Borras 
et al. (2012) see contemporary land grabbing as marked by three defining features that are worth 
considering as backdrop to thinking about water grabbing. 
First, land grabbing is ultimately 'control grabbing', or capturing the power to control land and other 
associated resources such as water, and how they are used, in order to corner the benefits, a point that 
builds on Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) theory of access. Control grabbing can manifest in a number of ways, 
from land grabbing and water grabbing, to green grabbing (see Fairhead et al., 2012). This perspective 
obviously resonates with Mollinga’s (2008) argument for seeing water use as a politically contested 
process and water control as the "heart of water resource management". As several of the papers in 
this collection demonstrate, control grabbing is perhaps best seen as a contingent process, marked 
variously by conflict, negotiation and friction, that can end up ratifying an existing balance of power 
among state and non-state actors in steps along the way, even if only temporarily. Although poor 
people often lose out, under certain conditions, their political action can make a difference, however 
small. 
Second, today’s land grabbing is also defined by scale – both in terms of the size of the acquisitions 
and in terms of amount of capital involved. There is a strong tendency in the literature on land grabbing 
to try to define land grabbing mainly in terms of the physical size of the land acquired alone (see, for 
example, World Bank, 2010; Oxfam, 2011; Anseeuw et al., 2011). But by incorporating scale of capital 
into the unit of analysis, land and other key resources like water become central in the operation of 
capital. A too land-centred view can overlook the underlying logic and operation of capital and also miss 
the diversity of biophysical requirements in capital accumulation dynamics: 300 ha of high-value 
vineyard, 500 ha of rare metal mining concession, 100,000 ha of land for industrial tree plantation, and 
500,000 ha of grazing land for livestock may have comparable scale in capital (and for that matter scale 
of labour involved) despite the huge discrepancy in physical land requirement between them. 
Third, and finally, what is also distinct in the current land grabbing, according to Borras et al. (2012), 
is their occurrence primarily because, and within, the dynamics of capital accumulation strategies that 
are largely in response to the convergence of multiple crises: food, energy/fuel, climate change, 
financial crisis (where finance capital started to look for new and safer investment opportunities) 
(McMichael, 2012), as well as the emerging needs for resources by newer hubs of global capital, 
especially BRICS and some powerful middle income countries (MICs). The key contexts for land grabbing 
therefore include: food security concerns, energy/fuel security interests, climate change mitigation 
strategies, demands for natural resources by new centres of capital, as well as demands for flex crops: 
                                                          
3
 The term land grabbing goes back to Karl Marx who while remarking on the English enclosures said "Land grabbing on a great 
scale *…+ is the first step in creating a field for the establishment of agriculture on a great scale" (quoted in White et al., 2012).  
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crops that have multiple uses (food, feed, fuel, industrial material) that can be easily and flexibly inter-
changed: soya (feed, food, biodiesel), sugar cane (food, ethanol), oil palm (food, biodiesel, 
commercial/industrial uses), corn (food, feed, ethanol). Stepping back, the key contexts today for land 
grabbing appear to be the same for water grabbing. But applying a water lens arguably helps to both 
deepen and broaden our understanding of how each of these operate, and bring greater visibility to the 
truly far-reaching water impacts of both land and water grabbing. 
Due to a growing body of empirical research on the global land grabbing, a number of inconvenient 
facts are forcing many to rethink some of their initial perceptions and assumptions, which in turn have 
bearing on how we think of some (types of) water grabbing. Some of these have to do with who is 
doing the grabbing and why. For example, what was initially seen as a phenomenon driven in the global 
South by only certain States in the North, is now increasingly recognised as a much larger and wider 
phenomenon involving capital from the North, South, East and West, from wealthy and middle-income 
states, and involving many intra-regional transactions and acquisitions by national elites as well (Cotula, 
2012; Visser et al., 2012; Kenney-Lazar, 2012). The heavy involvement of Thai government, business 
and financial interests in hydropower development in Lao PDR, for example, clearly illustrates this point 
(see Matthews, this issue). Moreover, as suggested earlier, the trend is not only about food production 
(and hence food security), but also (and possibly even more) about biofuel production, raw material for 
industrial products such as rubber, and flex crops. 
Other newer research findings have to do with the nature of the conditions under which land 
grabbing occurs. In fact, there is quite a diversity of conditions involving varying degrees of physical 
violence, clientelist coercion, transparency, or formal legality. The kinds of resource rights (as well as 
use benefits) that are involved also vary, ranging from statutory land tenure rights, to customary land 
tenure rights, which may or may not be recognised by central state law, and are often very context-
specific. Meanwhile, in many (most?) cases so far, research is showing that the supposed benefits of big 
land deals are not materialising or not materialising to the extent originally claimed, leaving many to 
wonder if they ever will. The UN Committee on Food Security (CFS) High Level Panel of Experts on Food 
and Nutrition released a report on global land grabbing in July 2011 saying that there is no evidence to 
validate claims about win-win scenarios in large-scale land investments that benefit the poor (HLPE, 
2011). 
And finally, alongside these other emerging issues, now there is growing concern about the water 
dimensions of land grabbing, which raises the question: why is there a growing attention on water 
amongst observers of land grabbing? As Woodhouse (2012) explains elsewhere, it is difficult (if not 
impossible) to grab water without grabbing land. Many authors in this collection confirm that land and 
water are deeply entangled in land grabbing in practice. There is a perceived general pattern that 
investors do not seek lands that do not have water for production in the first place. So, land in itself is 
meaningless for their purpose without water. In some cases where a so-called marginal block of land is 
given to a company, the water dimension becomes apparent immediately. This is the case of Procana 
sugar cane plantation in Mozambique which is a 30,000 ha plot adjacent to Massingir dam to ensure 
water supply for the plantation (van der Zaag et al., 2010; Borras et al., 2011), for example. It is also 
clearly the case in the Tana delta case examined by Duvail et al. (this issue). In the Tana delta case the 
Kenyan government has targeted the Tana river basin for development, designating the floodplain area 
as 'unused' and the adjacent terraces as 'empty dryland' with irrigation potential. In other cases, the 
water implications of land grabbing have not been understood adequately, especially when in many 
cases water is made out to be 'abundant' and 'unused', particularly in the African context. Thus several 
papers in this issue focus on the water requirements of new crops and the implications of additional 
water consumption on local-level experiences of water availability and scarcity. 
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DEFINING WATER GRABBING 
Our starting point when we began work on this special issue was to define water grabbing as a situation 
where powerful actors are able to take control of, or reallocate to their own benefits, water resources 
already used by local communities or feeding aquatic ecosystems on which their livelihoods are based. 
This lens demands a focus on how material, discursive, administrative and political power is mobilised 
to enable such water reallocation and changes to tenure relations as well as the impacts of the latter on 
local livelihoods, rights, gender, class and other social relations. 
This collection thus takes a broad view of water grabbing. Some authors use it in relation to land 
grabbing as normally understood around large-scale (irrigated) agricultural projects (in this issue for 
instance Williams et al., Bues et al., Duvail et al.). Others see water itself as the object of the grabbing 
and demonstrate how water rights (both formal and informal) as well as benefits of use are reallocated 
to powerful players in mining, energy and hydropower projects in Peru, Turkey, India and the Mekong 
region. Islar (this issue), when focusing on hydropower development in Turkey, describes how exclusive 
access to hundreds of rivers and streams is being transferred to private companies for 49 years. 
Powerful actors use legal means as well as technical definitions to divert water and profit away from 
local communities living along rivers despite their resistance. In such cases, water grabbing actually 
involves both the physical capturing of the water itself in the hydropower plant transmission channels 
and the legal capturing of local people’s previously established (customary) rights to use the river water. 
Thus, the term grabbing highlights flawed legal procedures and political processes surrounding the 
capturing of water resources, whether directly connected to land deals or not, while others use it to 
stress the perceived illegitimate purposes of this capture, and still others to emphasise both aspects. All 
cases are characterised by unequal relations of power and complexities around process and 
mechanisms that facilitate grabbing in the first place. 
Though the dynamics around water grabbing have strong parallels with other resources grabbing 
like land grabbing and green grabbing, we argue in this collection that water resources also have their 
particular characteristics that have a marked influence on these dynamics. Water is fluid in nature: it 
flows, does not stay in one place, and at the same time water is in most places a renewable resource. 
This means that the availability of water fluctuates in space and time and these are relevant when 
assessing water allocation and actual water distribution. The case by Hertzog et al. (this issue) of the 
Office du Niger clearly demonstrates how important it is to thoroughly assess water requirements in 
space and time, rather than just looking at water volumes. Hence, even so-called non-consumptive uses 
such as hydropower can have important implications by changing the timing of water availability. The 
fluidity of water also implies downstream effects on people and uses and the need to look at wider 
impacts across a range of scales (i.e. within a watershed or basin). Ambiguity in jurisdictional area with 
administrative boundaries can make problems more severe, as for instance detailed by Arduino et al. 
(this issue), where a disputable land deal was processed in one district, while the downstream effects 
were only experienced in an adjacent district that was not in any way involved in the initial process. 
Thus the details of what is being grabbed, and relatedly, how, appear to be somewhat complicated 
with regard to water. This may be partly because of its acute importance for sustaining human life, 
partly because of the material characteristics of water itself and also hydrological complexity, and partly 
because of the very context-specific and multi-layered socio-political conditions by which water rights 
are determined and become 'visible', and by which the benefits of water access and use are controlled. 
Thus, due to the fluid nature of water, far-reaching impacts such as scarcity and pollution can extend 
across entire river basins. Kay and Franco (2012) argue that water and land grabbing is about 
investment in 'virtual water' (Allan, 2011) for agribusiness development: given the water resources that 
are required to produce agricultural products, global agricultural trade can also be seen as a massive 
transfer of water, in the form of commodities. Due to these distinct characteristics of water grabbing, 
our collection stresses the need to go beyond viewing merely the water implications of land grabbing. 
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This collection deploys a range of conceptual tools to understanding water grabbing. Sosa and 
Zwarteveen (this issue) show how water grabbing involves the enclosure of commons by multinational 
companies and government agencies, dispossessing peasants and indigenous people and altering the 
environment. Their understanding of water grabbing rests on the concept of waterscapes which allows 
recognising how the natural and the social always co-constitute each other, and how flows of water, 
power and capital produce uneven socio-ecological arrangements over space and time (see also Budds 
and Hinojosa, 2012). Waterscapes are also dramatically altered through processes of accumulation and 
by what has been termed the 'neo-liberal turn' in environmental governance which has resulted in the 
privatisation and commodification of water as the commons (see Bakker, 2002; Robert, 1993; 
Swyngedouw, 2006; Shiva, 2008). As several contributors to this issue note, such privatisation and 
commodification processes can escalate local water conflicts, as in the case of a public-private 
partnership in Morocco (see Houdret, this issue) or legitimise the dispossession of vulnerable groups 
and paramilitary violence in marginalised parts of the global South, as in the case of the Cauca region in 
Colombia (see Vélez Torres, this issue). Seen in this light, water grabbing is a particular form of 
accumulation by dispossession under neo-liberalisation leading to the commodification and 
privatisation of resources, the eviction of certain groups and the conversion of various forms of 
property rights into exclusive private property rights (cf. Harvey, 2003, 2005). Finally, water grabbing is 
also linked with the financialisation of natural resources. This ranges from the financialisation of water 
services and infrastructure to, what is somewhat unchartered territory, the financialisation of the 
resource itself whereby water is transformed as a commodity tradable on large-scale global markets 
through water trading schemes (Tricarico and Amicucci, 2011). 
A sceptical reader may well argue that unequal control over water is as old as the hills, just as land 
control is (cf. Peluso and Lund, 2011). Water is a contested resource and access to water reflects power 
asymmetries, socioeconomic inequalities, and other distribution factors, such as the ownership of land. 
Since time immemorial, water as a finite but multifaceted resource has been subjected to contests 
rooted in relations of power both at the discursive and material level (cf. Mosse, 2003; Mehta, 2005; 
Mollinga, 2008). Thus, at one level, water grabbing is not very different from any other processes of 
contestation over water as a limited resource between actors with unequal powers. 
However, while control over water resources has traditionally been associated with state control 
and domination by national rulers (cf. Wittfogel, 1957; Worster, 1983), the term water grabbing draws 
attention to the involvement of new capitalist players and actors in water resources management and 
the rise of new political and economic power relations through diverse trajectories of neo-liberalism. In 
the water sector, much of this of course began 20 years ago in 1992 at the Dublin International 
Conference on water and the environment where the still controversial declaration of water as an 
economic good led to greater adherence to free-market capitalism and the commodification of water 
(see Allouche and Finger, 2002; Nicol et al., 2012). The economic valuation of the resource rapidly 
became part of wider debates on environmental resources and 'water scarcity' more generally (Mehta, 
2010) but these processes largely concerned water service delivery, ostensibly as a means to increase 
efficiency and enhance access (ibid). Now, 20 years on, we are witnessing the privatisation not just of 
the service or the accompanying infrastructure but of the resource itself. Thus, several contributions in 
this issue discuss how rivers are being captured and privatised for the energy they can generate, how 
water is being reallocated to corporate players, and how laws and policy processes are being redefined 
to legitimise these processes (see Wagle et al., this issue). We now turn to look in depth at the key 
processes that justify and facilitate water grabbing. 
DRIVERS AND NARRATIVES JUSTIFYING WATER GRABBING 
There are many processes driving the continuing global rush for water. The ones that come through 
most clearly in this collection are as follows. First, driven by predictions of 'peak oil' and growing 
concerns about rising GHG emissions and climate change, new energy security concerns and interest in 
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alternative energy sources that could be portrayed as renewable, are in turn driving both expanding 
biofuel production and hydropower development (see articles in this issue by Williams et al., Bues et al., 
Duvail et al., Matthews, and Islar). A related trend at the global level is the so-called 'securitisation' of 
the environment accompanied by talk of future threats to human security and the so-called food-
energy and water nexus that is driving new hydropower and energy developments. Second, the 
promotion of especially private (foreign and domestic) investments by host national governments also 
appears as an important driver of water grabbing (in this issue: Bossio et al., Vélez Torres, Sosa and 
Zwarteveen, Arduino et al., Woodhouse, Hertzog et al., Houdret, Wagle et al., Matthews, Islar, Duvail et 
al., Bues et al., and Williams et al.). In our collection we thus have articles that discuss the surge in 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in agriculture in part driven by the 2008 food crisis and the need to 
secure lands to grow grain as well as the desire to increase agricultural productivity, new public-private 
partnerships in irrigation, local-global capital transactions around mining, the promotion of special 
economic zones as well as corporate takeovers of hydropower development. Finally, a crucial aspect 
promoting water grabbing that is not linked to land grabbing is the wider sectoral reform of the water 
and energy sectors encouraging privatisation and deregulation, often in the name of 'efficiency' 
promoted by multilateral and regional banks. 
Power produces knowledge à la Foucault and there is no dearth of dominant narratives that justify 
processes of water grabbing. Gasteyer et al. (this issue) draw on Jasanoff and Kim’s (2009) notion of 
national socio-technical imaginaries which serve as collectively imagined forms of life and order 
reflected in the design of scientific and/or technological projects. Their analysis of water grabbing in 
Palestine in a historical perspective shows how ideas of modernisation formed the nucleus of an 
imaginary of improved humanity through land and water transformation, accompanied by settlement 
and colonisation. While the Zionist and Israeli grabbing of Palestinian land and water resources has 
largely been motivated by political, ideological and religious rather than economic reasons, the case 
demonstrates how contemporary grabbing can be seen in relation to other historical processes. Thus, 
according to Gasteyer et al., water grabbing involves a similar imaginary of energy, food, and water 
scarcity solved through large-scale land investment, resulting in increasingly productive resource use. 
The article demonstrates how the early Zionist movement (including the Christian explorers who toured 
Palestine in the 1800s) built a narrative of settlement potential and untapped abundance (i.e. the 'land 
of milk and honey'), very similar to the recurring narratives of 'unused' and 'marginal' land as terra 
nullius that accompany modern day land/water grabbing. 
The global discussion and debate over contemporary land and water grabs have been revolving 
mainly around two related yet distinct narratives. The marginal land narrative has been deployed to 
justify large-scale commercial biofuel crop production in particular; by targeting and using 'marginal' or 
'degraded' land in particular, biofuels (it is assumed) will not compete with food crop production for 
prime land (defined as prime in part because of proximity to/availability of water), and therefore not 
undermine food security, thereby making biofuels seem more benign. The possibility of biofuels 
competing with food production for land, especially in rural areas in the global South where hunger and 
malnutrition are most concentrated, was seen as a key argument against biofuel promotional policies in 
the European Union, for example. The unused or underutilised land narrative, by contrast, has been 
used implicitly to justify the promotion of a model of agricultural production characterised by large-
scale, monocropping, high-tech (inputs, mechanisation etc); anything less 'productive' in terms of yields 
is assumed to be 'unused' or 'underutilised'. Both of these narratives contain optimistic assumptions 
about water use that, under closer scrutiny, evaporate. For instance, Williams et al. (this issue) observe 
how "companies initially leased large-scale lands to grow a crop, Jatropha, which is less water 
demanding but have ended up diversifying into other crops that require full or supplemental irrigation 
to give optimal yields". An interesting parallel is raised in the case of hydropower development in 
Turkey (Islar, this issue) between narratives justifying water grabbing for hydropower and narratives 
justifying land grabbing for biofuels, in that "[n]arratives from governmental and private sector officials 
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consider water as wasted if it flows without being utilized as a resource for irrigation, energy or other 
purposes". 
An important point here too is how these various sub-narratives have eventually been brought 
together to form an even grander narrative about vast quantities of land – and it is assumed water – for 
future exploitation on a large scale. The World Bank (2010) says that between 445 million to 1.7 billion 
hectares of land globally have been identified as 'suitable' for agricultural investments. However, such 
figures and portrayals are based on narrow parameters and yardsticks. In the satellite imagery and GIS 
systems that provide legitimacy for notions of 'marginal', 'sparsely populated' and 'unproductive' lands, 
social and economic relations and livelihoods remain invisible. Census data often do not capture non-
monetised goods and services that sustain millions. 
Such narratives are particularly strong with respect to sub-Saharan Africa, the focus of most of the 
articles in this special issue. A dominant narrative is one of underutilised land and water resources that 
require investment to 'unlock' their potential and drive the engine of development (World Bank, 2008; 
2010). Africa is considered to be a 'sleeping giant' with an abundance of water and land, ready to be 
woken up by commercial agriculture (World Bank, 2009). Africa is also seen to face 'economic water 
scarcity' (Molden et al., 2007), a situation where it lacks the economic and financial capacity to develop 
its 'abundant' resources. 
However, as several of our contributors demonstrate, it is debatable if this land is indeed unused or 
even underutilised. The narratives of 'unexploited resources' provide justification for governments to 
displace existing users of resources and the ways in which smallholder farmers use their water remain 
unrecognised (cf. Woodhouse, this issue; van Koppen et al., 2005). The 'economic scarcity' arguments 
say nothing about the socio-political and constructed nature of scarcity (cf. Mehta, 2010) and how FDI 
investments can create new scarcities. They could also justify the involvement of the private sector in 
irrigation due to ostensible shortage of public funds as well as improved cost efficiency and water 
productivity as demonstrated by Houdret’s analysis of a public-private-partnership in Morocco (this 
issue). In sum, drivers supported by powerful narratives have propelled the global rush for water, 
operating through specific processes and mechanisms to which we now turn. 
MECHANISMS AND PROCESSES 
Water grabbing is a complex process. In most of our cases, financiers, bureaucrats, water, energy and 
agricultural specialists, global, regional and national banks as well as business elites at the local, 
national and global levels are rapidly transforming and transnationalising the waterscapes upon which 
local lives and livelihoods depend. Past beneficiaries of irrigation become today’s dispossessed; those 
who had enjoyed use rights over river and water resources for decades or centuries suddenly emerge 
as illegal users; laws that are supposed to protect local users are either weak and ineffective or 
rewritten. Some of this takes place with the acquiescence or 'buy in' of local communities but mostly 
these processes are met with overt or covert resistance. 
We thus see a variety of mechanisms and processes through which water is being grabbed, including 
conditions that facilitate water grabbing. In almost all cases the grabbing process is in one way or 
another made possible by the state in which grabbing is taking place. In India, sectoral reforms are used 
as a mechanism to legalise and legitimise processes of water grabbing. The state also takes advantage 
of the obscurity in the policy regime and when challenged on legal grounds, reform instruments are 
blatantly redefined (Wagle et al., this issue). In many cases, state organisations creatively bend or re-
interpret existing rules and regulation that should actually prevent grabbing to take place. An example 
is the case of Ethiopia where the Water Resources Management Proclamation is supposed to protect 
local users’ legitimate interests (cf. Bossio et al., this issue). In yet other cases, state organisations fail to 
enforce the law even when attempting to do so. Formal requirements for large-scale land and water 
deals, such as Environmental Impact Assessments and/or community consultations are often ignored 
Water Alternatives - 2012  Volume 5 | Issue 2 
Mehta et al.: Introduction to the Special Issue: Water grabbing? Page | 201 
(in this issue: Arduino et al., and Matthews), and when they are implemented they can be used for 
window-dressing rather than that they help to prevent resource grabs (Duvail et al., this issue). 
Water grabbing is also possible due to new coalitions of interests. For a variety of reasons, many 
governments and bureaucrats within government agencies have interests in large investments. In some 
cases this leads to active support, invitations or collaboration in which public institutions or coalitions 
between politicians and/or high-level bureaucrats serve private interests (cf. Wagle et al., this issue; 
Vélez Torres, this issue). In the mining case in Peru described by Sosa and Zwarteveen (this issue) this 
developed to such an extent that regional water authorities in practice left all responsibility for water 
management to a mining company which became the de facto water management authority. 
Grabbers often make use of the legally complex situations around water tenure. New commercial 
users usually coexist with complex non-registered users who are invisible. This legal pluralism can be 
both enabling and disabling but largely it is difficult for local users to defend their claims. Companies 
often strengthen their informal social and political networks to influence governance processes. 
Hertzog et al. (this issue) refer to the latter as "a fragmented negotiation process, whereby different 
investors have used different networks in the administrative and political apparatus in order to secure 
both suitable land and water arrangements". 
In a few cases, authors describe that water rights in practice come automatically with land rights and 
are not subject to a separate process. Williams et al. (this issue) argue that in Ghana the separation of 
these land and water rights created the space for water grabbing; pre-existing customary water rights 
were abolished and instead ownership, management and control of water were placed under authority 
of the state. In most cases included in this special issue (large-scale) water use officially depends on 
government-issued licences that come with a fee-paying requirement. Hertzog et al. (this issue) 
describe how the Malian government increased the water fee for a hectare of rice in the dry season 
more than tenfold to discourage smallholder farmers to continue this in order to make water available 
for large-scale agricultural investors. 
Local-level complexities also determine outcome. With limited bargaining power and vulnerable 
livelihoods, many local water users accept the low financial compensation that is offered which is often 
higher than normal earnings. In Peru, financial compensation was offered to existing water rights-
holders, even though the Peruvian Water Law (2009) forbids water trading. Local leaders can also be 
subject to corruption which allows companies and powerful players to acquire water rights from local 
communities. Though difficult to detect by definition, perhaps especially so at higher levels of the 
political system, corruption appears to be a key factor in allowing new dams to be constructed in Lao 
PDR as well, even though they largely serve the interests of the Thai energy sector. Matthews (this issue) 
points out several hydropower projects that went ahead despite the fact that the legally required EIAs 
had not (yet) been done or submitted, giving off 'a bad smell' (apparently a euphemism for corruption) 
according to one high-level official interviewed. 
We also consider cases in which local communities suffer from pollution by upstream powerful 
actors as cases of water grabbing. Water grabbing does not necessarily involve the diversion of (large 
volumes of) water. The process through which water grabbing takes place in these cases is an 
externalisation of problems and costs which are transferred from the causers to these communities 
(Arduino et al., this issue; Sosa and Zwarteveen, this issue). 
Finally, certain conditions can undermine or impede the process of water grabbing. These include an 
informed public debate taking place prior to project approval and implementation, protest and 
resistance, wider political change, litigation and efforts to demand and increase accountability. All of 
these have the potential to change the outcome around the grabbing process. Still, as will be evident 
shortly, in the cases that we present in this issue most of them have met with limited success. 
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IMPACTS AND RESPONSES 
In all the cases presented in this issue, water grabbing has led to a significant re-appropriation of water 
resources and water tenure relations with implications for basic human rights. Various papers describe 
how downstream communities lose their secure access to water for irrigation or other agricultural 
water use. In India, planned canals have been abandoned and the irrigation potential has been 
drastically reduced because most of the water has been diverted to petro-chemical industries and 
thermal plants owned by major corporate houses (Wagle et al., this issue). Houdret (this issue) 
describes how deep drilling by agricultural investors may intensify water conflicts and increase the 
marginalisation of small farmers as shallower wells used by local communities may dry up. Furthermore, 
farmers were not compensated adequately for the land acquired for the new water pipeline. Bues (this 
issue) describes how water rights have changed both directly and indirectly on foreign horticulture 
farms in Ethiopia. Direct changes include new associations reshaping formal agreements and indirect 
changes to water access and withdrawal rights which are directly tied to land rights. The re-
appropriation of resources described in this and most of the other cases in this issue is only possible 
due to sharp power inequalities between resource poor smallholders and government-based investors 
and companies. 
Access to water is not simply a case of total volumes, but concerns distribution in time and space. 
Woodhouse cautions that "the nature of water constraints is intermittent and highly specific to key 
moments in crop development" similar to Bossio et al., who stress that "variability of water supply in 
space and time" need to be considered in the context of water planning for FDI projects. Thus there is 
need to assess available and required water for specific periods, i.e. those of water scarcity. Hertzog et 
al., exemplify this by stressing the importance of distinguishing between the dry and the flood season, 
as the Niger river has very different discharges in these two periods. Water demand has always focused 
on the water-abundant flood period, but now tends to shift to the water-short dry season, depending 
on the actual crop choice for different investment projects yet to be determined. 
In Colombia, already marginalised Afro-descendant communities lost their access to the Cauca river 
(a powerful symbol of life) which provided transportation, riverine gold-mining, fishing, and recreation. 
This also radically affected their traditional culture, which depends on the river (Vélez Torres, this issue). 
For them, water grabbing has been a long process of systematic dispossession from their land and 
water resources as well as territory marked by violence and paramilitary incursions. Our only historical 
case of water grabbing, that of Palestine, also highlights significant injustices in terms of water rights 
(Gasteyer et al., this issue). Since the occupation of Palestine and the growth of Israeli settlements, 
there are strict military orders restricting water withdrawals and access to the Jordan river and the 
Dead sea by Palestinians with Palestinians having access to only about 10% of the entire annual 
recharge capacity of the West Bank water system. 
In many cases, water grabbing concerns the diversion and consumption of (large amounts of) water 
which then is no longer available for downstream use. Bossio et al. (this issue) provide crude estimates 
of consumptive water use and indicate a wide range of possible water consumption scenarios regarding 
a large number of FDI schemes in Ethiopia. They demonstrate that the increased water consumption 
will depend on crop-choice and water use practices, but that the minimum additional water 
consumption will be greater than current total annual irrigation water while the maximum will be 
almost five times the current use. Water grabbing does not necessarily involve the consumption of 
(large quantities of) water; also water quality can be negatively affected in such a way that downstream 
water is no longer suitable for consumption and/or irrigation. Arduino et al. (this issue) describe a case 
in which upstream land use in a case considered to be land grabbing, pollutes drinking water sources of 
downstream communities. Sosa and Zwarteveen (this issue) describe how mines in Peru pollute water 
resources with acids, heavy metals and tailings (leftover from ore-extraction) to such an extent that it 
can no longer be used for smallholder irrigation downstream. 
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Local communities have reacted in different ways to these impacts. In five out of the 14 papers in 
this special issue the authors describe resistance by local communities, often supported by NGOs, 
media and sometime government agencies and politicians. Mostly these alliances protest on basis of 
violations of existing laws, rules and/or regulations. Arduino et al. (this issue) describe a case in which 
an NGO (ACRA) supported a local community’s Water Users Association (WUA) in claiming their rights, 
which led to a negotiation process with the basin authority as a mediator. Pressure was increased by 
drawing the attention of national politicians. They consider the negotiation process successful, but also 
note that a written agreement is still lacking. In the process the WUA was strengthened and "acquired 
knowledge, authority and a deeper sense of its water rights and the need to claim them". In the case of 
mining in Peru, the local communities are divided in different factions and government agencies take 
conflicting stances regarding the conflict. National government had to speak out on the case before 
local community leaders approached the regional water authorities to pressure them to follow up on 
national rules. Hertzog et al. (this issue) describe how in 2011 the Malian government withdrew 
280,000 ha out of the 870,000 ha allocated to investors following pressures by media and politicians. 
The reason for withdrawing was stated as 'non-compliance with procedures', but large foreign 
investors’ projects that had not followed the procedures remained untouched. 
In the cases described by Islar, Wagle et al., and Vélez Torres in this issue, alliances of farmers, NGOs 
and local communities vigorously disputed the policies of their states that legalised or facilitated water 
grabbing. Water grabbing via river privatisation has mobilised broad-based, multi-class opposition in 
Turkey, despite the socially differentiated impacts of hydropower development. The Turkish state’s 
more recent responses to such mobilisation with draconian measures reveal a shift toward a more 
'active exclusionist' approach according to Islar. Wagle et al., describe a long process of protest, 
involving pleas to the Chief Minister, negotiations with the Water Resources Department (WDR), public 
interest petitions, court cases, demonstrations and several 'sit-ins'. However, due to the blatant power 
play at the state level, water grabbing which secures water to facilitate domestic and international 
private investment is allowed to continue. Vélez Torres describes how Afro-descendant communities 
and organisations confront the responsible companies, but primarily aim their protests at the state and 
its support of projects and laws that threaten their existence. Despite these protests, the local 
population was forced to move out of the project areas. While these do seem like bleak results, these 
movements are providing us with alternative vocabularies and approaches to counter the logic of water 
grabbing processes. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This special issue focuses on both highlighting the missing water dimensions in debates on the global 
rush for land as well as demonstrating how in many cases water itself is an object of grabbing. In doing 
so, it has sought to widen the lens of resource grabbing as merely an agriculture-driven process. This 
collection also demonstrates that due to the fluid nature of water, its demand and availability fluctuate 
in time and space making it difficult to characterise the precise nature of grabbing, appropriation and 
reallocation and their varied impacts across multiple scales and time frames. In some cases, the actual 
resource or benefit being grabbed is in itself intangible because water may not always be the resource 
of interest; it often serves a particular purpose of production of value for which often also other 
resources are needed: land particularly, but also the re-ordering of labour and jobs, value chains and so 
on. These combine with the fuzzy, obscure and fragmented processes around negotiation, 
interpretation and enforcement of policies and laws to make water grabbing a highly slippery process 
indeed. 
While there is growing recognition that grabbing often involves the disregard for or outright 
dismantling of customary and/or even statutory land rights, the violation of basic human rights and the 
generation of harmful social and environmental effects, mainstream policy responses have tended to 
focus on minimising these 'risks' through the creation of mechanisms to apply international standards 
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via a code of conduct (cf. von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009), or principles of responsible agricultural 
investments (see, e.g. World Bank et al., 2010), or initiatives for improved transparency and 
information disclosure (see, e.g. Global Witness et al., 2012). Such approaches proceed in part on 
optimistic assumptions about the benefits to be gained from the associated large-scale investments. 
However, there is as yet little evidence regarding actual social or environmental benefits or that such 
initiatives would work in practice. It is highly questionable whether such codes, principles or initiatives 
can really work in such a charged context where the level-playing field is so unequal. Indeed, water and 
other forms of resource grabbing bring wider development and economic growth paradigms into 
question, highlighting the need to limit unfettered resource extraction, flows of capital as well as the 
gross injustices borne by those who bear the brunt of the re-appropriation of landscapes and 
waterscapes. 
Even though many of the dynamic protests around the world have not succeeded in reversing the 
trends of neo-liberal environmental governance and capitalist accumulation in the cases described 
above, alternatives at the margins are being proposed. In Colombia, local inhabitants, social 
organisations, and several scholars are calling for the need to reinforce alternative local – global 
linkages in order to protect their territories and enable another 'Paz-ific', a play on the sound of and the 
adjective peaceful in Spanish (Vélez Torres, this issue). In India, many local communities constantly 
resist forced displacement due to special economic zones and hydropower projects, contributing to 
time and cost overruns, stay orders from the courts and, in some cases, termination of projects. In 
Morocco, Houdret (this issue) describes how the Arab spring has allowed previously marginalised 
farmers new opportunities to regain control over water, their livelihoods and potentially some (political) 
power. Thus, movements protesting grabbing processes are providing us with new tools to counter 
some of the mechanisms of grabbing processes. Engaged scholars are also helping to create new 
vocabularies and imaginaries that can challenge dominant narratives that justify such appropriations. 
Indeed, the recent flurry of scholarship on grabbing processes is revealing that even so-called marginal 
lands are highly productive for those who live off them and that narratives of abundant and 
underutilised waters need to be reconsidered. 
Writing in the turbulent 1940s Karl Polanyi (1944) cautioned against treating land and labour as 
commodities dis-embedded from social and cultural processes – to which we could add water. He 
suggested these are 'fictitious commodities' that cannot be governed solely by the logic of the market. 
Land, labour and water are crucial for human existence, and therefore, arguably, market mechanisms 
should not be the sole regulators of land, labour and water use. When that does happen, the 
endurance of human society and nature may be undermined, as Polanyi suggested. Almost 70 years on, 
in the midst of a financial crisis and neo-liberal market enthusiasm, his words seem to be as relevant as 
ever. 
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